Azad Jammu and Kashmir AJK, which is traditionally considered as base camp of Kashmir independence movement, has seen a recent stir to political consciousness among its younger generations. As it stands in the shade of its dependent affiliation with Pakistan and its existence in the greater Kashmir dispute, there is a surging civic nationalism which is now reshaping the internal political rhetoric of AJK. This paper discusses the rise of youth-based nationalism within the context of Social Movement Theory that explains how discontent, mobilizing structures, and political opportunity lead to collective action.
The analysis
adopts a qualitative approach based
on secondary sources, political sources, and reports about mobilization of
youth. The results indicate that nationalism has emerged due to continuous
political dependence, inequitable access to resources, and an apparent lack of
leadership, especially following the removal of special constitutional status
in Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 2019, by India. Against this background, the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC)
rallied the youth on the grounds of dignity, fairness, and autonomy. Construed
as civic instead of separatism, this
nationalism strains toward equitable cooperation with Pakistan and poses a threat
as well as an opportunity to reformative democracy in AJK.
Keywords: Azad Jammu and
Kashmir, civic nationalism, youth mobilization, Social Movement Theory, Joint
Awami Action Committee
Azad Jammu Kashmir AJK holds a very
distinctive place in the politics of the South Asian region. As an established
autonomous state on paper, its government and political structure are still
intimately connected with Pakistan.[1]
This order established by the events of 1947, and by the continued conflict
over Kashmir has long limited the ability of AJK to express itself as
politically independent. Over the past few years, however, a noticeable change
has taken place in the younger generation of the region. Young people are
becoming more vocal in their complaints of insufficient political space,
economic dependency, and constitutional ambiguity, leading to the development
of new versions of nationalist consciousness.[2]
BY:Usama Jamshed
Youth
constitute a large portion in the population of AJK and therefore, crucial to
the social and political future of AJK. Their aspirations are the product of
various strata of experience: as a lived reality of constrained freedom, as a
result of unemployment and underdevelopment, and as a result of exposure to
wider global discourses diaspora subjects and the internet. The combination of
these conditions has produced a situation in which the young generation is
challenging inherited political arrangements and insisting on identity as
Kashmiris.
It
is hard to say that nationalism among youth is emerging out of vacuum. Instead,
it became influenced by the historical grievances, empowered by the current
frustrations, and politically organized through the collective platforms like
the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC).
Movements of this sort represent examples of how channeled discontent
translates itself into coherent political demands through organized group
effort. Social Movement Theory is a
valuable to contextualize these changes because it highlights what happens when
grievances, resources and opportunities collide, turning disparate frustrations
into combined action.[3]
This trend is currently evident in the growing nationalism of Kashmiris in AJK,
as the existing discourse i.e. the demands of the youth is slowly being
reshaped by the youth activists.
Although
the cooperation between Pakistan and AJK has traditionally been discussed as
the support of the bigger Kashmir agenda, the sheer interest of Pakistan in the
local political sphere of AJK has also raised concerns. The synchronization of
AJK political systems with the national politics of Pakistan has not allowed
much autonomy in decision-making, which is seen as a barrier to true
self-representation by the young AJK liberties. Instead of outright rejection,
their demands capture the appeal to dignity, involvement in decisions, as well
as recognition of their role as agents in the determination of the future of
the region.
The
emerging youth nationalism in Azad Jammu and Kashmir has significant
implications on Kashmir dispute and the overall stability of the region. It
does not only pose challenge to established order but provide the opportunity
of fruitful interaction. If approached constructively, in an inclusive manner,
the aspirations of the youth can become a source of democratic renewal and if
handled with force, alienation and instability are likely to increase.[4] In
this sense, the growing political awareness of the young people in AJK is an important
aspect both locally and in broader geopolitical context of the South Asian
region.
The
politics of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) can be considered as a byproduct of
the larger Kashmir conflict that has occurred as a result of the Partition of
British India in 1947.[5]
After the tribal support and the subsequent war between India and Pakistan, the
territory now called AJK became the administrative part of Pakistan, whereas
the other part of the princely state was left in the hands of India. Since that
time, AJK had lived in a rather ambiguous constitutional state: it is neither
the province of Pakistan and nor it is a fully recognised sovereign state.
Rather it operates within a system, which on the one hand provides partial
autonomy whilst still maintaining overall control by Pakistani institutions.[6]
AJK
in early decades had interim arrangements to handle the political affairs
mainly. The formation of AJK Government in 1947, which had a President and a
Prime Minister, was an indication of somewhat independence but the Interim Constitution
Act of 1974, curtailed few freedom of the territory. In this arrangement,
matters pertaining to defense, currency, foreign policy and communication were
reserved for Islamabad control, while the Kashmir Council, dominated by
Islamabad, wielded decisive influence over legislation and governance. This
institutional framework consolidated a dependency relationship at the expense
of political agency by AJK.[7]
AJK
also became dependent on party politics that was reflected in the region over
time. In AJK, political parties have been largely extensions of their
counterparts in Pakistan with electoral outcomes being a matter of power transfer
in Pakistani politics. This opposed the independent decisions of Kashmiri
electorate. This tendency has built up the assumption that the political order
in AJK is not genuine; the decisions of significant relevance to people seem to
be determined by the external forces. These perceptions have gradually led to
the disillusionment of people and encouraged true demands of
self-representations.
These
political constraints in AJK are further compounded by economic factors.
Despite its rich natural resources, including hydropower potential, AJK has
faced persistent underdevelopment and limited industrialization. Meanwhile, one
should not disregard the historical role AJK played in the Kashmir issue as a
whole. With its political identity bound together with the self determination
of all the Kashmiris, the territory has been posed as the base camp of the Kashmir freedom movement.[8]
Such rhetoric has served the purpose of keeping Kashmir dispute alive on international
forums, but also led to internal stagnation in the development of democracy in
AJK. Political rhetoric continued to be premised on the external aspect of the
conflict, leaving domestic desires neglected.
The
birth of a new form of political consciousness among the younger generation in
the recent decades is a result of political dependency, economic grievances,
and inability to find any meaningful ways to engage in the decision-making
processes. The focus and direction of the current wave of nationalism in AJK is
totally different when compared to the previous ones since the current-day
nationalism is less concerned with the larger Kashmir question across the Line
of Control and more about questioning the established governance in the region
and the role played by Pakistan in establishing it. This historical progression
is necessary to gain the context of the recent phenomenon of youth-led
nationalism in AJK.
The
increase in the nationalism of the youth in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) cannot
be seen in a vacuum. It is the result of systemic circumstances that have been
in progress for a long time with some sudden political surprises and generation
changes. Social Movement Theory can be used to give an explanation to this
phenomenon that is based on collective grievances, mobilizing structures, as
well as political opportunities (5TH August 2019).[9] In
this context, youth nationalism in AJK is an outcome of the sense of political
dependency, disappointment with the economy, and also the phenomenon of
emerging mobilization avenues, and of the lack of true representative
leadership.
The
political framework of AJK has always been affected by its subordination to
Islamabad. Although AJK has its own constitution and an elected legislative
assembly, but major powers have traditionally laid with the Kashmir Council and
the Government of Pakistan. Policy-making, finance, or even constitutional
reforms were subordinate to the approval of Islamabad, and the extent of real
autonomy was limited.[10]
This system was frequently defended on the basis that it was necessary to
preserve unity in the wider Kashmir issue, but in practice it constrained the
development of AJKs indigenous political capability.
This
dependency was supported by local political leaders who would always support
Islamabad authorities on any given direction rather than developing a strategy
of their own. There are major political parties in AJK which are the direct
extensions of similar parties in Pakistan hence the findings on the polls thus
tend to be an echo of those that occur in the national capital Islamabad.
Gradually, this led to a frozen view that the politics of the AJK was not
primarily a self-representation system but rather a satellite of Pakistani
national politics.
The
youth nationalism is also motivated by identity based grievances. For decades,
the official discourse in AJK emphasized its role as a base camp for the
broader Kashmir freedom struggle. Although this narrative retained a symbolic
solidarity with the people of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, it somehow
overshadowed the internal needs of the AJK population and kept them marginalized.
Irrespective of this, the AJK people still maintained a strong emotional and
ideological bondage with the greater Kashmiri freedom movement. The martyrdoms
of individuals in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir proved to be the constant
reminder of their unity of identity and cause. To these young people,
solidarity with the oppressed on the other side of the Line of Control played a
central role in their political consciousness. They turned to their own leaders
to harness this sentiment into effective political action, most potently in
times of crisis.[11]
That
crisis occurred with what happened on August 5, 2019. The abrogation of the
special status of Jammu and Kashmir by India was seen as the most potent threat
to Kashmir identity and demands. The time required an action of clarity,
determination, and mobilization on the part of the leadership in AJK. The local
political elite instead of being proactive which would have been expected of
them were more or less passive, having no plan of action on how to channelize
the anger and lead the young generation in this time of crisis. Their silence
was deafening during this period, when people especially the youth expected
something concrete to be done. Not only did this aggravate disillusionment but
it also undermined the AJK as the keeper of the freedom struggle.
Without
any leaderships, a political vacuum was created. Into this vacuum came the
grassroots organization and movements like the Joint Awami Action Committee
(JAAC) who echoed the anger of the youth. These new actors appealed to the
grievances that long-established leaders had avoided, and they visibly exercised
agency where others had sat back, and they thus successfully re-engineered the
status quo they vice-versa turned discontent into nationalist mobilization. The
lack of political leadership did, thus, not only mark incompetence; it
refashioned AJK politics by making youth central to nationalist practice.
Economic
grievances are among the main factors which promote nationalist feeling.
Although, the AJK has a rich geography in terms of available resources, it is
in an underdeveloped state economically. It is cited that exploitation of
resources like hydropower, especially in projects like the Mangla dam has been
exploited without benefit sharing. Although such hydropower projects help in
fulfilling energy requirements of Pakistan (2900MW), but it has come at the
cost of people, who have been left displaced, poor compensation and inadequate
reinvestment.[12]
The
economic under-development on the other hand brings with it, high unemployment
rate (18%) which is highest ratio in the whole region which leads to limited
opportunities for the youth. Industrialization and employment within AJK is not
very developed, thus the need to migrate outside has become a norm. On the
other hand no bank in AJK can handle the remittances sent by their oversea
people. Rather these remittances contributes a major portion in Pakistan’s
foreign currency reserves, but again the benefits are not shared to AJK people
proportionately. This large diaspora has been both a symptom of economic
stagnation and a catalyst for political awareness. The experience of democratic
political systems and civil liberties in other countries has transformed the
mindsets of the young Kashmiris and led to further calls of demand on greater
political freedom and self-determination back in the homeland.[13]
Grievances
in themselves are not devoid of movements, but they do need mobilizing
structures to organize movements. In case of AJK, the diaspora has taken the
central stage. The Kashmiri diaspora, especially the United Kingdom and Europe
has been a vocal promoter of the political rights of Kashmir. The young people
in AJK are linked heavily with these diaspora networks both through family
bonds, remittances, and communication networks. The diaspora not only furnishes
resources, but also supplies an external audience capable of validating
nationalist discourses developing in AJK.[14]
Social
media has shifted to how we mobilize as well, the widespread use of platforms
like Facebook, X, and WhatsApp allow the youth in Kashmir to establish
grievances, organize protests, as well as refute narrative-controlled by the
state. Social media stretches voices that have otherwise been silenced and enables
local activism to reach international geographies. Importantly, it also
decreases the dependence on the old system of politics and allows the youth an
autonomous platform to influence and disseminate nationalist rhetoric.[15]
Mobilization
is also achievable through grassroots networks which are usually based on
student groups, cultural associations and informal neighborhood committees.
Such networks give the organizational foundation needed in order to sustain
activism.[16]
They enable them to co-ordinate protests, share ideas and build a sense of an
identity not based on allegiance to a party but on the national identity.
A
leadership vacuum, thus, not only underscores the frailties of the old
political dispensation but serves as justification to the rise of new actors.
It was a turning point whereby the youths of AJK, who used to be marginal to
politics, became the center of defining and pursuing nationalistic interests.
The
formation of Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) was a major landmark in the
politics of AJK. It is an effort by the grassroots leaders to gain power after
years of reliance on external political forces.[17]
Through empowering the younger generations and framing their grievances, which
was avoided by the mainstream parties, JAAC was able to channel national
frustrations into a nationalist movement.[18]
Its emergence depicts the way movements born out of leadership vacuum can
transform the discourse of politics, especially when the movements rely on
inclusive organizing, non-traditional structures, and symbols of collective
identity.
JAAC
was formed by an alliance of traders, the civil society, students, and
professionals and over time came together to form an umbrella body that
transcend partisan divides.[19]
Relative to what had been happening under normal political organizations, it
did not originate from some kind of elites negotiations or simply orders coming
down from Islamabad. Rather, it took hold on local issues, electricity prices,
and taxes among other issues as well as larger questions of political autonomy.
Such a bottom-up formation set JAAC apart from mainstream parties in AJK, whose
policies quite often reflected a change in the state politics in Pakistan. In
establishing a platform not bound to any political affiliations with
traditional political structures, JAAC won the confidence of young people, who
had long needed a movement that spoke to their lived experiences.
The
most central accomplishment of JAAC is in creating organized activism out of
isolated grievances. Problems of unequal electricity tariffs, resource
extraction without any local benefit, and political sidelining had existed
since long.[20]
However, they have been isolated and divided. JAAC filled in this gap by
placing these complaints within a larger nationalist context- showing them not
as administrative shortcomings alone but rather as manifestations of structural
subordination.
By
style of protest marches, sit-ins, and awareness programs, JAAC organized
groups of people both in that urban and rural regions. The cumulative strength
of the demonstrations that it organized on various issues typically involving
thousands of people was also an indicator of how deeply people were frustrated
as well as its mobilizing strengths.[21]
The social media enhanced these initiatives and the movement was able to reach
out to the diaspora and gain attention outside of AJK.
The
young people constituted the core of the activism of JAAC. Feeling
disenfranchised with the organizational politics of the mainstream, young
Kashmiris took JAAC as an avenue to find agency. Student groups, unemployed
graduates, and young professionals engaged in the most active protestation and
sustenance of protests. To most of the youth, the party epitomized the hope
that they may free themselves of the dependency cycle that had become characteristic
of the politics by AJK. By casting the local battles in terms of volition of
dignity, justice and autonomy, JAAC appealed to the generational will of
relevance in politics.[22]
Theirs being young leaders of the JAAC further concretised the impression that
JAAC was a real alternative to the old political elite.
In
comparison with the conventional political activism in AJK, the approaches
adopted by JAAC were original. JAAC incorporated following strategies
·
Decentralized
organizing:
JAAC did not make decisions based on a pyramidal structure; instead the
organization facilitated a more flexible structure, which provided a greater
amount of initiative compared to local chapters and other community groups.
·
Issue based framing: Issue based framing
enabled JAAC to make the movement both accessible and transformative by
relating short term social-economic issues (e. g electricity price rise) to
nationalistic issues.
·
Non-partisan
positioning:
JAAC did not have to appeal to one party or group, which had to give JAAC
credibility in the eyes of various social constituents.
·
Symbolic language: Use of articulation
of the protests by JAAC as a struggle to obtain dignity and rights appealed to
historical memory in Kashmir and made it more palatable to its nationalist
audiences.[23]
The
emergence of JAAC also redesigned its relation with the AJK government and
Islamabad. Although it did not oppose completely the relation with Pakistan,
JAAC had a critical stand in the aspect of relation with Pakistan. It demanded
respect of autonomy of AJK, more control over resources and sincere political
space to local actors.[24]
In
the process of doing so, JAAC assumed an attitude of constructive criticism.
Instead of positioning its demands as secessionist, it focused on the factors
of dignity, fairness and justice in the context of historical commitments.[25]
This balancing of the diplomatic playing field enabled JAAC to escape the
countering to being simply dismissed out of hand as being called an anti-state
organization, and yet it raised issues of objections to the status quo.
In
spite of its successes, JAAC has a number of issues that may determine its
path. And to start with first, it may not be easy to sustain the momentum
without institutional structure. Political parties that emerged out of
demonstrations usually fail to mature into the more permanent political
organizations.[26]
Second, state ability to co-opt or repress grassroots activism is a threat to
independence of JAAC. Lastly, the internal diversities that entail maintaining
a balance between socio-economic demands and nationalist ambitions will only be
managed with prudent leadership in order to curtail fragmentation.
JAAC
can be regarded as a transitional movement eventually. It arose as a
consequence of a leadership vacuum and used grievances to make them
collectively effective and changed the political rhetoric of AJK.[27]
The question of whether it will become a permanent political force is to be
questioned too, as well as the future potential catalyst of the current
movement. Still, one cannot underestimate its role in influencing the political
process; namely, the voices of younger generations and ordinary citizens were
brought back to the center of the political struggle in AJK, as the nationalist
framework proposed by the organization includes notions of dignity, autonomy,
and socio-economic justice.
The
increased civic nationalism of the young generation in AJK poses as a stress as
well as an opportunity to Pakistan. On the one hand, the growing feeling of
political dependency, unequal distribution of resources and perceivable vacuum
in political leadership has given rise to a new political awareness which is
questioning the established order. Demands of Youth participation through Joint
Awami Action Committee (JAAC) show that younger generation in AJK are not
satisfied with a mere demonstration anymore, but they require to play a role. Otherwise,
these voices can be overlooked or even silenced, and Pakistan runs the danger
of increasing the level of disillusionment and alienation in the region that
has historically been regarded as the base camp of the Kashmir freedom
struggle.
Civic
nationalism offers Pakistan a chance to form a stronger connection with AJK on
the other hand. This nationalism is not based on separatist ideology as it is
anchored in idealism of equality, equality, and collaboration. It can earn
legitimacy in AJK by positively addressing its young people by recognizing
their aspirations and can use them to project themselves to the international
community as a state, which allows democratic rights and expression and
promotes a peaceful process.
In
order to exploit this opportunity, a number of policy actions are imperative.
The first is that Pakistan needs to provide AJK with more political space
through decentralization and empowerment of local institutions. Second, equal
access and distribution of resources to eliminate long economic resentment.
Third, youth-specific initiatives in education, occupation, and civil societies
need to be increased to direct the zeal of Kashmiri youth into constructive
avenues. Lastly, Islamabad should employ a participatory strategy that involves
the young people in the greater Kashmir struggle, as opposed to merely
recipients of policy.
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Véronique, and Crispin Bates, eds. The Global Indian Diaspora: Narratives,
Identities and Locality. London: Routledge, 2007.
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(European Foundation for South Asian Studies). “Civic Nationalism in AJK:
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Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990. London: Roxford Books,
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Ershad. Azad Jammu and Kashmir: The Struggle for a Political Space.
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of Dependency in AJK.” Strategic Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 23–48.
“The Impact of Mangla Dam Expansion on AJK’s
Economy.” Pakistan Development Review 47, no. 4 (2008): 491–509.
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Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative Perspectives on
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Uddin, Irfan, and Sumit Ganguly. “The Political Use of Social Media in
Kashmir.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 131–137.
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Adnan. “From Movements to Parties: Lessons from South Asia’s Protest Politics.”
South Asia Journal 42, no. 1 (2021): 55–72.
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Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. 3rd
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[1] Ershad Mahmud, Azad Jammu and Kashmir: The Struggle for a Political Space (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
[2] Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir (London: Hurst, 2012).
[3] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[4] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[5] Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990 (London: Roxford Books, 1991).
[6] Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir (London: Hurst, 2012).
[7] Ershad Mahmud, “Politics of Dependency in AJK,” Strategic Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 23–48.
[8] Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021).
[9] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[10] Ershad Mahmud, Azad Jammu and Kashmir: The Struggle for a Political Space (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).
[11] Suhasini Haidar, “Explained: The Revocation of Article 370 and Its Aftermath,” The Hindu, August 6, 2019.
[12] Ershad Mahmud, “The Impact of Mangla Dam Expansion on AJK’s Economy,” Pakistan Development Review 47, no. 4 (2008): 491–509.
[13] Véronique Bénéï and Crispin Bates, eds., The Global Indian Diaspora: Narratives, Identities and Locality (London: Routledge, 2007).
[14] Sten Widmalm, “Kashmiri Diaspora and Political Mobilization in the UK,” Contemporary South Asia 22, no. 4 (2014): 456–473.
[15]Irfan Noor Uddin and Sumit Ganguly, “The Political Use of Social Media in Kashmir,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 131–137.
[16] Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768–2012 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).
[17] “Civil Disobedience in AJK: JAAC’s Rise against Political Dependency,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2023.
[18] “AJK’s Youth Movement Reshaping Politics: The Role of JAAC,” The News International, March 3, 2024.
[19] Traders, Students Unite Under JAAC Banner in AJK,” Express Tribune, August 22, 2023.
[20] Ershad Mahmud, “Politics of Dependency in AJK,” Strategic Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 23–48.
[21] “Mass Protests Sweep AJK Over Power Tariffs,” BBC Urdu, May 14, 2023.
[22] “Youth at the Forefront of JAAC Protests,” Al Jazeera English, May 15, 2023.
[23] “JAAC Movement Gains Cross-Party Support in AJK,” Dawn, September 2, 2023.
[24] “AJK Government Engages with JAAC Leaders amid Protests,” The News International, October 6, 2023.
[25] “Civic Nationalism in AJK: Implications for Pakistan,” EFSAS Commentary, April 2024.
[26] Adnan Rafiq, “From Movements to Parties: Lessons from South Asia’s Protest Politics,” South Asia Journal 42, no. 1 (2021): 55–72.
[27] “Civil Disobedience in AJK: JAAC’s Rise against Political Dependency,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2023.