Human Insecurity and Water Inequality: The Socio Political Impact of the Indus Waters Treaty on the People of Kashmir
Human Insecurity and Water Inequality: The Socio Political Impact of the Indus Waters Treaty on the People of Kashmir
I. Introduction
Water serves not only as a fundamental source of life but also as a catalyst for power dynamics, conflict, and insecurity in South Asia. Within this region, characterized by significant water stress and susceptibility to conflict, the Indus Basin has historically been a focal point of political tensions between India and Pakistan. At the time of the Partition in 1947, approximately 90% of Pakistan's agricultural output was reliant on irrigation from the Indus system, yet the headworks of major rivers were situated in India.^1 On April 1, 1948, India ceased water supplies from the Ravi and Sutlej rivers, severely impacting canals in central Punjab and leading to crop failures in Lahore, Faisalabad, and Multan.^
RESEARCHER: Khurram Rehman
This action precipitated an existential crisis for the newly formed state and underscored the necessity for a permanent resolution. The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), facilitated by the World Bank, allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. Although lauded as a rare diplomatic success, the Treaty institutionalized India's upstream advantage and largely disregarded the perspectives of Kashmiris residing along the headwaters.
Over time, India's development of projects such as the Baglihar Dam and the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project has exacerbated Pakistan's sense of vulnerability while directly displacing Kashmiri communities. The construction of the Baglihar Dam alone resulted in the displacement of over 1,500 families in Ramban, many of whom did not receive adequate rehabilitation,^3 while the diversions associated with the Kishanganga project reduced the capacity of Pakistan's Neelum–Jhelum project by 16% and simultaneously deprived Kashmiri farmers and fisherfolk of essential resources.^4 Despite generating thousands of megawatts of hydropower, Kashmir experiences 12–14 hours of daily load-shedding during winter, as electricity is redirected to India's national grid.^5
Thus, while the IWT has averted interstate "water wars," it has entrenched state-centric priorities at the expense of human security in Kashmir. This research reorients the analytical focus towards the Kashmiris themselves, illustrating how the Treaty has contributed to water inequality, displacement, and socio-political marginalization. By employing both Hydro politics Theory and the Human Security Framework, it reevaluates the IWT not as a paradigm of cooperation but as a structure that has perpetuated insecurity in a region prone to conflict.
IWT as a
Case of Successful Water Diplomacy
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has often
been celebrated in scholarship as a rare example of enduring cooperation
between two hostile states. Despite the wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999, as well
as ongoing disputes over Kashmir, the treaty has largely survived (Alam, 2002;
Salman & Uprety, 2002). For many scholars, the IWT demonstrates that even
in conflict-ridden regions, functional
cooperation over shared resources is possible. Haines (2017) situates
the IWT in the post-partition history of India and Pakistan, framing it as a
diplomatic achievement that prevented water wars. Similarly, Pohl and Schmeier
(2014) emphasize that the treaty provided institutional mechanisms, such as the Permanent Indus Commission,
which have allowed disputes like Baglihar and Kishanganga to be managed without
escalation into full-scale war.
Yet, this
“success story” framing is increasingly contested. Critics argue that the IWT’s
durability does not necessarily indicate fairness or justice. Rather, it may
reflect the political expediency of
elites in both countries, who prioritized interstate stability over the
well-being of river-dependent communities in Kashmir (Mustafa, 2010). Thus,
while the treaty prevented interstate conflict, it has not resolved local grievances.
Debates on Hydro
politics in South Asia
Hydro
politics scholarship emphasizes how water resources are embedded in power asymmetries. Zeitoun and Warner
(2006) describe such dynamics as hydro-hegemony,
where upstream states dominate downstream ones through infrastructure, legal
frameworks, and political influence. Applied to the Indus Basin, this framework
highlights how India’s upstream
position enables it to exert control over flows, constructing projects
like Kishanganga and Baglihar under the legal allowances of the IWT.
Mustafa
(2010) argues that hydro politics in South Asia is marked by geopolitical securitization, where
water is viewed as a strategic resource rather than a human necessity. For
Pakistan, water scarcity is often framed as an existential threat, amplifying
the India–Pakistan rivalry. Gopalakrishnan (2005) further notes that the IWT
constrained Pakistan’s capacity for water development, creating a long-term
structural disadvantage.
Comparative
studies, such as Swain (2011) on the Nile, suggest that South Asia is not
unique: Transboundary Rivers often become sites of contestation when
upstream–downstream inequalities are institutionalized. However, in the case of
Kashmir, these debates intersect with a territorial
dispute, amplifying both hydro political and socio-political tensions.
Human
Security and Environmental Governance in Conflict Zones
Traditional security studies tend to focus on state sovereignty, but the human security paradigm (UNDP, 1994) shifts attention toward individuals and communities. Human security encompasses economic, food, environmental, and political dimensions—all of which are threatened when water access is restricted or when populations are displaced by development projects. Environmental governance in conflict-prone regions is particularly complex.
Dams and hydropower projects are often justified as
instruments of national development but produce localized human insecurity in the form of displacement, ecological
degradation, and livelihood disruption (Wirsing, Jasparro & Stoll, 2013).
In Kashmir, projects like the Baglihar
and Kishanganga dams have forced relocation of communities without
adequate compensation, generating resentment and insecurity (Mustafa, 2010). Moreover,
scholars like Iqbal (2006) argue that securitization of water in South Asia has
subordinated human and ecological concerns to national security logics. This not only limits sustainable
development but also exacerbates local grievances, particularly in politically
sensitive regions like Kashmir where development is intertwined with
militarization.
Lack of
Focus on Kashmiri Voices and Lived Experiences
While there is a substantial body of literature on the interstate dynamics of the IWT, far less attention has been given to the voices of Kashmiri communities, who live along the rivers and directly experience the treaty’s consequences. Most studies frame the IWT either as a diplomatic success or as a geopolitical tool, but rarely as a human security issue. Existing analyses of Baglihar and Kishanganga primarily focus on legal disputes between India and Pakistan rather than the displacement of Kashmiri families, the loss of agricultural land, or the ecological transformations affecting fishing and farming communities (Mustafa, 2010; Wirsing & Jasparro, 2007).
Furthermore, the
lack of Kashmiri representation in IWT negotiations or in the Permanent Indus Commission highlights
a democratic deficit in water governance. Thus, there exists a clear research gap: the absence of
Kashmiri perspectives in both academic and policy discourses. Addressing this
gap requires shifting from a state-centric
approach to a human-centric lens,
one that foregrounds lived experiences of insecurity, inequality, and
exclusion. This research contributes to filling that gap by focusing on the
socio-political impacts of the IWT on Kashmiris themselves, rather than on
states alone.
Water as a Strategic and Political Resource
Hydro
politics, sometimes referred to as the politics of water, explores how Transboundary
Rivers and water systems become arenas of cooperation, contestation, and domination (Wolf, 1999). In
international politics, water is not only a source of life but also a strategic resource that can be
leveraged for political power, national security, and economic development. As
Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue, water governance is rarely neutral it reflects
power hierarchies between states and communities.
Power Asymmetries in Upstream–Downstream Relations
The location
of a state along a river system profoundly shapes its power. Upstream states often enjoy structural
advantages: they can build dams, divert flows, or threaten reductions in water
supply. Downstream states, in
contrast, face vulnerabilities, depending on upstream goodwill or legal
agreements. These asymmetries create a fertile ground for disputes,
negotiations, and sometimes coercion (Mustafa, 2010). In South Asia, the Indus Basin embodies such asymmetries.
India, as the upstream riparian on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab),
wields significant hydrological leverage. Pakistan, as the downstream riparian,
is deeply dependent on consistent flows for its agrarian economy. The IWT was
meant to address these vulnerabilities, but critics argue that it
institutionalized India’s upper-hand by permitting limited upstream projects
while restricting downstream development (Gopalakrishnan, 2005).
Application to Kashmir
The theory
is particularly useful in analyzing Kashmir, where hydro politics intersects
with territorial conflict. India’s control over Kashmiri Rivers at their headwaters allows it to construct
projects like Baglihar and Kishanganga, which, though legally
permissible under the IWT, reduce flows into Pakistan and disrupt local
Kashmiri livelihoods. Thus, water becomes a tool of both geopolitical leverage and domestic domination. In
this sense, hydro politics explains how [1]the
IWT reflects and reproduces power
asymmetries: it entrenches upstream dominance (India), downstream
dependence (Pakistan), and marginalization of local riparian communities (Kashmiris) who were not party to the
treaty but bear its consequences.
2. Human
Security Framework (UNDP, 1994)
Seven Pillars of Human Security
The Human Security paradigm, first
elaborated in the UNDP’s Human Development Report (1994), shifts the
focus of security from states to individuals. It emphasizes freedom from want and
fear, and protection of human dignity. The framework identifies seven pillars:
- Economic security – ensuring a basic income and
livelihood.
- Food security – reliable access to adequate
food and water.
- Health security – protection from disease and
unsafe living conditions.
- Environmental security – safeguarding ecosystems and
natural resources.
- Personal security – protection from violence and
displacement.
- Community security – preservation of cultural
identity and cohesion.
- Political security – protection of rights, participation, and representation.
Implications for Kashmiri Communities
The
application of this framework reveals how the IWT, despite stabilizing state
relations, generates insecurities for
ordinary Kashmiris:
- Economic security: Farmers in both IOJK and PAK
face reduced irrigation due to diversion projects. Hydropower projects
displace families, stripping them of livelihood sources.
- Food security: Reduced River flows impact
agriculture and fisheries, threatening household food supplies.
- Environmental security: Large dams like Kishanganga
alter river ecosystems, submerge villages, and damage local biodiversity.
- Personal security: Forced displacement due to
dam projects erodes community stability and exposes families to poverty
and uncertainty.
- Political security: Perhaps the most significant
insecurity—Kashmiris were excluded
from treaty negotiations and remain absent in decision-making
bodies like the Permanent Indus Commission, leaving them voiceless in
matters directly affecting their survival.
Historical and Political Context of the Indus Waters Treaty
Structure of
the Treaty: Allocation of Eastern and Western Rivers
After years
of tense negotiations mediated by the World
Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT) was signed on September
19, 1960, by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The treaty divided the six rivers of the Indus Basin:
- Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej):
Allocated exclusively to India.
- Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab):
Allocated to Pakistan, with India allowed limited uses (non-consumptive,
domestic, agricultural, and hydroelectric generation).
This
division was intended to minimize disputes by creating clear allocations rather
than shared usage. The treaty also included provisions for dispute resolution
through a Permanent Indus Commission
(PIC), neutral experts,
and ultimately, arbitration via the International
Court of Arbitration if required. While the IWT ensured Pakistan’s
access to the western rivers, it also institutionalized
India’s upstream control over Kashmir’s rivers, shaping the
hydro-political dynamics of the region.
The Role of
the World Bank as Guarantor
The World
Bank played a central role in brokering the treaty, providing both technical
expertise and financial assistance. It helped mobilize international funding
for Pakistan to construct dams, barrages, and canals (such as Mangla and
Tarbela) to compensate for the loss of eastern rivers. The Bank acted as a guarantor, ensuring compliance and
mediating technical disputes.
However,
critics argue that the World Bank’s approach reflected a technical and apolitical framing of water governance,
overlooking the deeper political and social issues at stake. By prioritizing
state-level negotiations and engineering solutions, the World Bank ignored the human and regional dimensions,
especially the interests of Kashmiris whose lands and rivers were directly
affected.
Human
Insecurity and Water Inequality in Kashmir
The Indus
Waters Treaty (IWT) has often been praised as a successful example of
transboundary water cooperation. Yet, for the people of Jammu and Kashmir—the
very region through which the Indus and its tributaries flow—the treaty has
generated profound human insecurity
and entrenched water inequalities.
While India and Pakistan secured state-centric interests, Kashmiris were
excluded from decision-making and left to bear the consequences of externally
imposed governance frameworks. This section analyzes these insecurities in
terms of access to water and livelihoods, displacement from mega-projects, and
political exclusion.
1. Water
Access and Livelihoods
Agriculture and Irrigation Dependency
Kashmir’s economy has historically depended on agrarian production sustained by the Indus river system. Crops such as rice, maize, and wheat are highly dependent on irrigation from tributaries like the Jhelum and Chenab. However, under the IWT, Pakistan received rights to the western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus), while India retained control of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) and was allowed limited “non-consumptive” uses of western rivers, including run-of-the-river hydroelectricity projects.
For
Kashmir, this arrangement created structural constraints. Farmers face
irrigation shortages due to restrictions on building large-scale canals and
diversion projects. While water flows through Kashmiri territory, its
utilization is heavily circumscribed by treaty limitations and federal control.
This undermines local food security,
leaving rural communities dependent on imports from other Indian states or
Pakistan-administered regions.
Restricted Industrial Development
The IWT indirectly hinders industrial growth in Jammu and Kashmir. Manufacturing and agro-based industries, which rely on stable electricity and water supply, remain underdeveloped compared to other Indian regions. Although hydropower projects are being built, their benefits accrue primarily to the Indian national grid rather than local consumption. For instance, hydroelectricity from projects on the Chenab and Jhelum is transmitted to northern Indian states, leaving many Kashmiri households with erratic power supply.
This creates a paradox: Kashmir produces electricity but
faces chronic load-shedding. The
result is uneven development, where the region bears environmental costs
without proportional economic returns.
Unequal Distribution of Benefits from Hydropower
Projects
India has
justified large hydropower projects in Kashmir as environmentally sustainable
and necessary for national development. However, for local communities, these
projects deepen inequalities. The Baglihar
Dam (on the Chenab) and the Kishanganga
Project (on the Jhelum) diverted river flows, altering irrigation
patterns and reducing water availability downstream. While New Delhi secures
energy and strategic leverage against Pakistan, Kashmiris lose agricultural
productivity, fishery resources, and river-based livelihoods. Thus, the IWT
entrenches a system where water is treated as a strategic asset for states rather than a basic human need for Kashmiris.
Forced Displacement, Land Loss, and Livelihood
Insecurity
Hydropower
projects in Kashmir are rarely accompanied by sustainable rehabilitation plans.
Families displaced by dams face economic
marginalization, with loss of agricultural land pushing many into casual
labor markets. Moreover, displacement often occurs without meaningful
consultation, reinforcing a sense of political alienation. The broader picture
reveals a cycle: Kashmiris lose land and water, are inadequately compensated,
and then watch the benefits of these projects flow outward to India’s
industrial centers.
2. Political
Exclusion and Representation
Centralization of Decision-Making in New Delhi and
Islamabad
Water
governance in Kashmir is highly centralized. In India, the central government
controls major hydropower projects through national corporations, sidelining
local legislatures. In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Islamabad dictates
water-sharing arrangements, with local leaders having little authority to
negotiate with India. This concentration of power leaves Kashmiris dependent on
two competing capitals, neither of which prioritizes their socio-economic
welfare. The result is what scholars call “double marginalization”: excluded from both the IWT framework and
domestic governance structures.
Militarization of Water Resources in Kashmir
Rivers in
Kashmir have also become militarized spaces. Security forces guard dam sites,
restricting civilian access to riverbanks. The strategic value of water—as a tool for India to pressure
Pakistan—has turned hydropower projects into security installations. For local
populations, this means increased surveillance, restricted mobility, and a
sense of dispossession. This militarization also amplifies conflict dynamics.
In moments of political crisis, Kashmiri communities fear that water resources
may be manipulated as a weapon of
coercion, further deepening their insecurities.
1.
Kishanganga Dam (Neelum–Jhelum Conflict)
The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project, located in Indian-administered Kashmir on the Neelum River (a tributary of the Jhelum), has been one of the most contentious projects under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Completed by India in 2018, the project diverts water from the Kishanganga/Neelum River to the Jhelum, thereby reducing downstream flows into Pakistan’s Neelum Valley, where the Pakistan-initiated Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Project is located. Pakistan took the matter to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, arguing that India’s diversion violated the Treaty’s provision that water use should not cause “material harm” to the other party.
The PCA’s 2013 ruling
allowed India to divert water for power generation but required a minimum flow
to Pakistan to mitigate environmental harm. For Kashmiri communities, however,
the dispute was not simply about technicalities of flow but about their direct livelihood impacts. Farmers in
Pakistan-administered Neelum Valley reported reduced irrigation potential,
while local activists argued that the dam heightened the sense of
marginalization by reinforcing external control over Kashmiri natural
resources. The project highlighted how Kashmiris
bore the costs of interstate competition without representation in
decision-making.
2. Baglihar
Hydropower Project Dispute
The Baglihar Hydropower Project on the Chenab River in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir was another major flashpoint. Initiated by India in the 1990s and operationalized in 2008, Pakistan raised objections that its design violated IWT specifications, particularly in relation to the dam’s storage capacity and drawdown flushing, which gave India potential control over water flows. The dispute was referred to a World Bank-appointed neutral expert, Professor Raymond Lafitte, who in 2007 upheld most of India’s design but required minor modifications.
While India viewed the decision as a diplomatic success,
Pakistan considered it a dangerous precedent enabling India’s greater
manipulation of Chenab flows. At the local level, Kashmiri villagers faced displacement, loss of agricultural land, and
altered riverine ecosystems. Many accounts (documented in secondary
sources) describe forced relocations with limited compensation, worsening
poverty and fueling resentment. The dam became both a symbol of development and dispossession, deepening alienation
among Kashmiri communities who were not consulted at any stage.
3. Local
Testimonies and Human Impacts
Beyond legal
disputes, both the Kishanganga and Baglihar projects underscore the human insecurity dimension of water
politics in Kashmir. Interviews and reports from NGOs and local media reveal
recurring themes:
- Loss of livelihoods: Farmers and fisherfolk in
affected valleys complain of declining productivity due to reduced water
availability.
- Displacement without adequate rehabilitation:
Families displaced by dam reservoirs have often been relocated to less
fertile land, with little long-term support.
- Psychological and cultural impacts: Rivers
like the Neelum and Chenab are central to local identity; their diversion
or damming is seen not only as economic loss but also as cultural
dispossession.
- Exclusion from governance: Local
communities repeatedly emphasize their lack of voice in planning,
reflecting the broader political
exclusion of Kashmiris under the IWT framework.
Conclusion
and Recommendations
This study examined the socio-political impacts of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) on the people of Kashmir, highlighting how a treaty designed to manage interstate conflict has overlooked local human security concerns. While the IWT successfully prevented direct water wars between India and Pakistan, it simultaneously entrenched a state-centric approach that excluded the very communities most affected by water projects. The Kishanganga and Baglihar case studies revealed that Kashmiri communities have borne disproportionate costs of hydropower development, including displacement, loss of livelihoods, and environmental degradation, without meaningful participation in decision-making.
Testimonies
show that water politics is not only a matter of sovereignty between states but
also of justice, equity, and survival
for marginalized populations. The findings demonstrate that the IWT, though
celebrated internationally, has contributed to human insecurity, water inequality, and socio-political alienation
in Kashmir. Climate change further exacerbates these challenges, making
existing arrangements increasingly unsustainable.
- Inclusion
of Kashmiri Stakeholders in Water Governance
- Both
India and Pakistan should institutionalize the participation of Kashmiri
representatives in all water-related negotiations, ensuring that local
voices and concerns are reflected in decision-making.
- Establish
local water governance councils to monitor dam construction,
environmental impacts, and resettlement policies.
- Incorporating
Human Security in Future Negotiations
- Shift
the focus of the IWT from state security to human security,
ensuring that policies safeguard livelihoods, health, and cultural rights
of affected populations.
- Introduce
mechanisms for social impact assessments before approving new
hydropower projects.
- Environmental
Justice and Sustainable Water Management
- Integrate
ecological concerns—such as river health, biodiversity preservation, and
sediment management—into water-sharing agreements.
- Require
both states to adopt environmental justice frameworks, ensuring
equitable distribution of benefits and fair compensation for displaced
communities.
- Renegotiation
/ Reinterpretation of the IWT in Light of Climate Change
- The
treaty must be revisited to address 21st-century challenges:
melting glaciers, erratic rainfall, and intensifying floods and droughts.
- Incorporate
provisions for joint climate adaptation strategies, basin-wide
water conservation, and renewable energy collaboration.
- Encourage mediation by neutral international actors (World Bank, UN) to update the treaty while preserving its conflict-prevention role.
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