This paper focuses on the emerging role of China in the Kashmir conflict and how such a role has transformed the conflict between India and Pakistan into a tripolar struggle involving India, Pakistan, and China. Based on a qualitative review of secondary sources, such as scholarly articles, government papers, official statements, and news articles, the study examines the intentions of China in Aksai Chin, its investments in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and how regional security is affected by the conflict between Sino-India.
The results indicate that the Chinese presence
empowers Pakistan, threatens India, and realigns the balance of power,
increasing risks and opportunities to threaten stability in South Asia.
Researcher:Bilal Tariq
Over the past several decades, the Kashmir conflict
was largely a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan over territorial
claims born of the partition of British India. But as years pass by, with the
emergence of a third major player, China, it has increasingly placed itself in
the politics of this conflicted region. China already manages Aksai Chin, a
region of strategic importance that India also claims, and has reinforced its
rule by building infrastructure (such as National Highway 219) to connect
Xinjiang with Tibet.[1] At
the same time, China exerts influence through the China-Pakistan economic
corridor (CPEC), which stretches through Gilgit-Baltistan and satisfies both of
Beijing interest in the economic corridors to the Arabian Sea and in
maintaining its regional control.[2]
This evolving landscape raises critical questions:
To what extent does China’s expanding footprint in Kashmir reshape the
geopolitical environment of South Asia? How does the Sino-India rivalry
influence the longstanding dispute over Jammu & Kashmir? These questions
form the core of this research, which seeks to fill scholarly gaps that
typically frame Kashmir as a strictly Indo-Pakistani issue, overlooking the
strategic implications of Chinese involvement.
This study aims to demonstrate that China’s growing
engagement in the region transforms Kashmir into a tripolar geopolitical arena.
It hypothesizes that Sino-Indian tensions not only intensify the Kashmir
dispute but also redefine strategic alignments, particularly between India,
Pakistan, and China. The paper will explore this through historical analysis,
infrastructure developments (like CPEC and Aksai Chin), and recent border
tensions to assess how Beijing’s interests and actions influence regional
stability.
While focusing on geostrategic dimensions, this
research will acknowledge limitations, including reliance on secondary sources
and evolving political developments that may affect the dynamics under study.
Nevertheless, by highlighting China’s role, the study aims to offer a more
comprehensive understanding of Kashmir’s geopolitical trajectory.
In recent scholarship, the Kashmir conflict is still predominantly viewed through the India–Pakistan bilateral lens, with most studies emphasizing historical partition disputes, national narratives, and military confrontations. However, this framing largely omits the strategic involvement of a third, dynamic actor, China, and its increasingly pronounced role in reshaping regional geopolitics. In the wake of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s investments, particularly under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), have triggered a re-evaluation of those traditional views.
One
2025 study observes that CPEC has altered the regional power equilibrium and
amplified China’s emergence as a central stakeholder in the Kashmir issue,
especially as it runs through the Gilgit-Baltistan region.[3]
Complementing this geopolitical perspective, the European Foundation for South
Asian Studies highlights how CPEC consolidates China’s strategic interests in
Gilgit-Baltistan and characterizes Islamabad’s moves, such as elevating the
region's constitutional status, as steps toward aligning more closely with
Chinese imperatives.[4]
Beyond geopolitical dimensions, empirical economic
studies demonstrate CPEC’s broader impact across Pakistan. Research indicates
significant positive effects from logistics developments on national economic
growth[5],
and tourism-focused investigations in Hunza show that while many view CPEC as a
potential economic game-changer, there are legitimate concerns about
environmental degradation and cultural disruption.[6]
Against Pakistan’s internal context, analyses of CPEC’s broader implications
present a dual-narrative: proponents laud it as a transformative infrastructure
investment, while critics warn of opaque financial arrangements, debt burdens,
and the risk of becoming overly dependent on Chinese influence.[7]
The strategic import of CPEC extends further into
regional diplomacy. Observers argue that CPEC strengthens the Sino–Pakistani
axis, serving both countries’ geopolitical ambitions while also deepening
India’s strategic insecurities in South Asia.[8]
Yet, the literature is less coarse in suggesting alternatives: some posit that
a long-term settlement of the Kashmir conflict could, even if optimistically, benefit
from CPEC-led regional integration, though this remains speculative rather than
empirically grounded.[9]
Meanwhile, historical and border-security literature
continues to provide context for the Sino–India dimension of the Kashmir
dispute. The Macartney–MacDonald line (1899) remains a reference point in
boundary discussions, though it was never adopted officially; it features
prominently in contemporary debates over border resolution options in Aksai
Chin. The notion of the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC) further encapsulates the
ambiguity of the Sino–Indian border, it is undefined, undemarcated, and remains
a persistent flashpoint for military and diplomatic engagements.
Across these literatures, geopolitical, economic,
environmental, and historical, there is a recognizable shift toward
understanding how infrastructure and strategic alignment are transforming the
Kashmir conflict. However, most studies remain siloed, focusing on either
economic outcomes, strategic implications, or historical border narratives
without fully synthesizing them into a comprehensive triangular analysis involving
India, Pakistan, and China.
Literature Gap
Despite significant progress, a holistic synthesis
is lacking. No study fully integrates how China’s expanding infrastructure and
economic footprint (via CPEC) intersects with historical border dynamics (such
as unresolved LAC disputes and legacy boundary proposals) to reconfigure the
Kashmir conflict from a bilateral contest to a complex tripolar struggle. This
gap, where strategic, economic, and historical dimensions converge yet remain
largely unconnected, presents a compelling opportunity for this research to
contribute a more integrated, multi-dimensional perspective.
The theoretical framework underpinning this research
is rooted in Realism, a dominant school in international relations theory that
emphasizes state behavior as motivated by power and security within an anarchic
system of self-help. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau highlight the
enduring relevance of national interest, defined in terms of power, over moral
or ideological concerns.[10]
Realism contends that in the absence of a central authority, states act
rationally to ensure survival, relying primarily on their own capabilities.
Structural Realism, or Neorealism, elaborated by
Kenneth Waltz, shifts attention from human nature to the systemic structure of
international politics, where the anarchic distribution of power largely
determines state behavior. Within Neorealism, two sub-streams diverge:
Defensive Realism posits that states seek sufficient power to secure their
survival and avoid aggressive expansion, thereby maintaining a stable balance
of power; Offensive Realism, by contrast, argues that states are incentivized
to accumulate as much power as possible, often through proactive or hegemonic
strategies.
In applying these realist insights to the context of
China's engagement in Kashmir, the theory helps explain Beijing’s strategic
calculus. China’s infrastructural projects like CPEC traversing
Gilgit-Baltistan, and its military strengthening near the LAC align with
offensive realist behavior, aiming to extend influence and preempt Indian
dominance. Concurrently, defensive realist logic is evident in China's efforts
to bolster its borders and secure its western flank, balancing regional power
dynamics without inviting overextension.[11]
In combination, these realist lenses illustrate how China's maneuvering in
Kashmir reflects calculated power-seeking and security preservation, framing
the region as an arena of tripolar balance and competition.
This study employs a qualitative research approach
using secondary data analysis to explore China’s role in the Kashmir dispute.
Qualitative methods are most appropriate for this research, as they allow for
examining political narratives, strategic decisions, and policy implications
that cannot be captured through purely quantitative measures.
The study draws on a wide range of sources,
including academic books and articles, policy papers, think-tank publications,
news outlets, and official statements from governments and international
organizations. Using this diverse material ensures that the analysis remains
both critical and relevant to current developments. The research relies on
content analysis to identify recurring themes and patterns in China’s strategic
approach to IIOJK. This involves looking at how China frames its interests in
platforms such as the United Nations, its discourse surrounding CPEC, and its
responses to tensions along the Sino-India border. Overall, this approach
provides a flexible framework for understanding the evolving nature of China’s
strategic interests in Kashmir.
China has strategic interest in Kashmir that goes
back many years and covers various domains. The national sovereignty and its
controlling interests with Aksai Chin, which were acquired in the Sino-Indian
War of 1962, remain the roots of Beijing interest in this area. It is a
strategic land bridge between Xinjiang and Tibet and China has tightened its
grip with infrastructure construction and surveillance along the border,
including a high-altitude observatory like the Heweitan, which is also the
highest outpost of the PLA in the border, and highlights long-term strategic
importance of its claims in Ladakh.
On the economic side, the CPEC is a key to China
regional calculus. This flagship of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connects
Xinjiang to Gwadar Port through the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan therefore
passing through the part of the territory which India claims as its own and
therefore India believes this is an encroachment of its sovereignty.[12] In
addition to its commercial prospects, CPEC will provide China with an access to
the Indian Ocean, providing an overland alternative to the strategic Straits of
Malacca that is a key part of the Strings of Pearls maritime strategy, which
forms a chain of Chinese control across the Indian Ocean Region.[13]
Furthermore, it consolidates Pakistan within China’s sphere, serving as both a
geopolitical lever and internal security buffer, particularly regarding
Xinjiang.
Militarily, China’s engagement is significant. Its
role as a major arms supplier to Pakistan is evidenced by the provision, and
even combat-level testing, of advanced weaponry such as J-10C fighters and
PL-15E missiles, which have featured prominently in skirmishes with India.[14]
This reinforces the military pillar of their partnership and indirectly
pressures India on two fronts, westward via Pakistan and northward via the
Himalayas. China's infrastructure build-up near the Line of Actual Control
(LAC), including PLA deployment and logistics networks, indicates long-term
defensive preparedness with offensive potential.[15]
Diplomatically, China’s posture remains calibrated.
While formerly more vocal in supporting Pakistan’s efforts to internationalize
the Kashmir issue, today China largely advocates a bilateral resolution, citing
the 1972 Shimla Agreement, reflecting a shift toward cautious neutrality. Nonetheless,
in multilateral forums, Beijing has shielded Pakistan, blocking listings of
terrorist groups like Masood Azhar and preventing formal declarations blaming
Pakistan-hosted militants.[16]
During crises, from Kargil in 1999 to post-Mumbai tensions, China has often
played the role of crisis manager, urging restraint and facilitating diplomatic
backchannels. Yet, this diplomacy serves dual purposes: helping prevent
escalation while maintaining the broader balance of power in South Asia.
When these factors are combined, China’s strategy in Kashmir reflects a careful balance of territorial control, economic expansion, military presence, and diplomatic messaging. Aksai Chin strengthens its internal connectivity, the CPEC extends its regional influence, military deployments reinforce deterrence along the border, and diplomatic efforts aim to project stability while protecting its ally. Consequently, the Kashmir issue has shifted from a bilateral dispute to a broader triangular geostrategic contest, with China exercising measured restraint and calculated influence.
The 2020 Galwan valley confrontation between the two
nations served as a tipping point which even extended beyond the specific
Sino-Indian front into the Kashmir strife. This face off heightened the tension
in the region forcing India to strengthen its security infrastructure in
Kashmir and reshape its strategic redemption, especially in such territories as
IIOJK. Years of relative stagnancy at higher altitudes were replaced with new
geopolitical vitality, as both neighbours re-evaluated threat perceptions and
force dispositions across the lines of contested borders.
India had a multidimensional reaction in Kashmir.
Internally, the revocation of Article 370 in 2019 had two clear purposes:
solidifying its rule and providing a strong political message to Islamabad and
Beijing alike. This act was also conceived to forestall the effect of external
(mainly Chinese) leverage on India, along the northern frontier. Beijing
stridently criticized the move arguing that it jeopardized sovereignty and
destabilized the region.[17]
From a security perspective, the Galwan clash
accelerated militarization in Kashmir. India significantly expanded its troop
presence, strengthened surveillance systems, and improved infrastructure along
both the Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control. Recent incidents of
violence, such as the Pahalgam massacre, further heightened tensions, resulting
in cross-border attacks and even the suspension of critical agreements like the
Indus Waters Treaty. This assertive posture reflects India’s attempt to project
strength and establish an environment aimed at deterring threats while
reshaping the dynamics of trilateral relations.
On Pakistan’s side, China’s rising influence has
both enabled and emboldened strategic gambits in Kashmir. By backing Pakistan
diplomatically in strategic forums by blocking condemnations or investigative
resolutions, China effectively shields its ally, complicating India’s attempts
to internationalize or globalize the instability. Additionally, this support
serves to counterbalance India’s outreach to partners in the Indo-Pacific (e.g.
the U.S., Japan, and Australia) that might otherwise marginalize Islamabad.
Regionally, the security dynamics have grown
increasingly volatile. Analysts warn that the intersection of India’s domestic
consolidation (via Article 370 revocation), heightened militarization, and
China’s backing of Pakistan risks creating a precariously unstable environment.
Events like the Pahalgam attack illustrate this fragility, prompting immediate
and forceful countermeasures, while raising fears of uncontrolled escalation.[18]
In this context, Pakistan’s military doctrine of “bleeding India through a
thousand cuts”, a sustained strategy utilizing proxy warfare and low-intensity
conflict, becomes especially concerning.
The implication is there to see: whereas the ongoing
Sino-India conflict may not directly entail Kashmir, it has a tangible effect
on how all regional players choose to calculate their actions in the region.
India is now far more entrenched politically and militarily, Pakistan has used
China as a lever, and this region is now at risk of becoming a flashpoint in a
wider tri polar contest. The processes can not only reinforce the conflict but
they can also open a new escalation avenue, particularly with mutual loyalty
and power position changes in South Asia.
The strategic alliance between Pakistan and China
has become one of the pillars of the South Asian geopolitics. This partnership
is dictated by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and cuts the field
of economic, military and infrastructural. China has invested billions in
Pakistan’s energy infrastructure, industrial zones, and transport networks,
prominently the Gwadar Port and modernized Karakoram and rail links connecting
to Xinjiang.[19] Militarily, Pakistan
sources over 80% of its arms from China, ranging from submarines to fighter
jets like the JF-17, reflecting a deep integration of defense capabilities.
Amid the evolving US–India strategic alignment, particularly
through the Quad and Indo–Pacific frameworks, China appears to be recalibrating
its regional posture. Rising protectionist policies and tariffs under US
leadership have pushed India to pursue more balanced ties, including a cautious
rapprochement with China, even while engaging with the Quad.[20]
In response, China is reinforcing its South Asian influence through Beijing-led
institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Global Security
Initiative, both aimed at offering alternatives to Western-led security models.
These developments bear significant implications for
Kashmir’s political future. China’s support shields Pakistan diplomatically by limiting
international consensus enabled through platforms like the UN, and indirectly
influences regional discourse on Kashmir. Militarily, the dual-pronged threat, Pakistan
reinforced by Chinese matériel plus China’s expanding border infrastructure, reshapes
India’s security calculations across its western and northern frontiers.
In the future, China has long-term regional security architecture focusing on sustainable and multipolar arrangements. The Global Security Initiative emphasizes cooperative and non-confrontational security, whereas China uses its strategic institutions and investments systematically to gain a foothold in a region. The spread of the CPEC into Afghanistan, as the issue of its expansion was discussed in trilateral discussions, also illustrates the desire of Beijing to expand regional connectivity and solidify strategic influence.
The findings from recent developments reveal a
nuanced transformation: China is emerging as a pivotal third actor in the
Kashmir conflict, no longer a passive observer, but an active shaper of the
regional geopolitical landscape. The 2025 aerial skirmish, in which Pakistani
forces employed Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets and PL-15E missiles, functioned
both as a real-time test of China’s military technology and as a demonstration
of its deepening role as Pakistan’s supplier and strategic partner. While
Beijing privately celebrated the effectiveness of its equipment, Chinese
officials maintained a public stance of restraint, seeking to preserve
relations with India and avoid strengthening Washington’s expanding
Indo-Pacific coalition.
Concurrently, China’s dual role as both enabler and
restraint-seeker underscores its strategic balancing act, seeking to fortify
Pakistan while preventing a regional spiral that could drive India deeper into
U.S. alignment. The episode yielded valuable intelligence for China, including
insights into Indian electronic warfare and drone capabilities, further
elevating its strategic calculus in the region.[21]
On multilateral platforms, Chinese influence has
also redefined the reaction to the Kashmir related crises. In the UN discussion
of the attack Pahalgam terrorist attack, a former Indian envoy to the UN
disparaged Beijing because it supported the Pakistani-led demand to conduct an
investigation, a partnership that ultimately blocked any kind of agreement.
This diplomatic protection gives China additional strategic space in support of
Pakistan and has made it difficult to internationalize the Kashmir issue by
India.
The new state of affairs has aggravated geopolitics,
regionally. Analysts suggests that the strategic orientations of India have
changed towards an inward-oriented strategy with a core emphasis on internal
stability and defence preparedness, as China takes a regional stance with CPEC
and intelligence gathering. The overlapping of military, diplomatic, and
infrastructural powers draws Kashmir to a tripolar theater of rivalry taken to
a higher level of competition.[22]
In sum, China’s deepening involvement in Kashmir is transforming the conflict from a bilateral confrontation into a complex trilateral contest. Beijing’s dual posture, empowering Pakistan while preserving delicate ties with India, creates a precarious balance. Its actions risk both escalation (through military and diplomatic support) and stabilization (via calls for restraint), positioning China as a strategic arbiter whose influence continues to define the contours of regional security.
This study analyzes how China’s expanding involvement
has transformed the Kashmir conflict from a bilateral dispute into a tripolar
geopolitical contest. Focusing on territorial control in Aksai Chin, economic
influence via CPEC, military cooperation with Pakistan, and strategic
diplomacy, the analysis demonstrates China’s deliberate and multifaceted role.
Through infrastructure and defense investments, Beijing has bolstered
Pakistan’s position, countered India’s unilateral actions, and intensified the
region’s strategic volatility.
The increasing Chinese shadow over Kashmir has
placed the main contribution of the study in context regarding the role of
China as its pivotal stakeholder who has begun to transform the context of the
conflict. This reframing is beneficial to the academic and policy discourses as
it provides a more system-wide picture of how infrastructure, arms, and
diplomacy interplay to affect regional stability.
For policymakers and regional actors, the
implications are significant. India must recalibrate its security calculus, not
only toward improving deterrence along the western front but also toward
managing a more assertive China. Pakistan’s deepening alignment with Beijing
offers both strategic support and dependency risks. Meanwhile, China walks a
delicate line—its investments amplify both its influence and the potential for
unintended escalation in South Asia.
Ultimately, this study points the way forward with
several avenues for further research. Future investigations could focus on
China's strategic calculus within multilateral institutions, its evolving
high-altitude infrastructure along the LAC, or the responses of secondary
actors such as Gulf mediators in shaping Kashmir’s future. By emphasizing the
tripolar interplay of infrastructure, military posturing, and diplomacy, this
research contributes a sharper, more integrated lens through which to assess
the future trajectory of the Kashmir conflict.
·
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[1] Shahzadi Irrum, “Kashmir Issue: A Strategic Competition,” The Geopolitics, April 12, 2023, https://thegeopolitics.com/kashmir-issue-a-strategic-competition
[2] European Foundation for South Asian Studies, China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Jammu & Kashmir (study paper, Amsterdam: EFSAS, February 2017), introduction, https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-and-jammu-and-kashmir/
[3] Ibrar Shehzad, Muhammad Haris, Faiza Jamal, and Mairaj ul Hamid, “Impact of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on Dynamics of the Kashmir Conflict between India and Pakistan,” Social Science Review Archives 3, no. 1 (2025): 1884–89, https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v3i1.496
[4] EFSAS, China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Jammu & Kashmir, introduction.
[5] Zunaira Khadim, Irem Batool, and Muhammad Bilal Lodhi, “China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, Logistics Developments and Economic Growth in Pakistan,” Logistics 5, no. 2 (2021): art. 35, https://doi.org/10.3390/logistics5020035
[6] Rehmat Karim et al., “Impact of China Pakistan Economic Corridor on Local Economy and Tourism Development: Case of Hunza, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan,” International Journal of Economic and Environmental Geology 11, no. 4 (2020): 14–17, https://www.econ-environ-geol.org/publications/study-papers/impact-of-cpec-on-local-economy-and-tourism-hunza/
[7] Vineet Malik, “The China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Justifications and Refutations,” Modern Diplomacy, September 16, 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/16/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-justifications-and-refutations/
[8] AGA Admin, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Project and Its Impact on India,” Asia in Global Affairs, November 17, 2018, https://www.asiainglobalaffairs.in/dialogue/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-project-and-its-impact-on-india/
[9] Christian Wagner, The Effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on India-Pakistan Relations, SWP Comments 25 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2016), https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256400
[10] Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisão, “Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations, February 27, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/
[11] Cate Cadell and Karishma Mehrotra, “China’s Warplane Combat Debut over Kashmir Riles Tense Geopolitics,” The Washington Post, May 17, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/05/17/china-j10-jet-pakistan-india-kashmir-combat/
[12] Firdous Ahmad Malik, “Kashmir’s Third Stakeholder: China’s Growing Shadow,” Brighter Kashmir, June 22, 2025, https://brighterkashmir.com/kashmirs-third-stakeholder-chinas-growing-shadow
[13] Adnan Ahmed, “India vs. China & the Role of Kashmir,” Voice of Balochistan, June 20, 2020, https://voiceofbalochistan.pk/opinions-and-articles/global-arena/india-vs-china-the-role-of-kashmir/
[14] Helen Davidson and Amy Hawkins, “Pakistan’s Use of J-10C Jets and Missiles Exposes Potency of Chinese Weaponry,” The Guardian, May 14, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/14/pakistans-use-of-j-10c-jets-and-missiles-exposes-potency-of-chinese-arms
[15] Malik, “Kashmir’s Third Stakeholder.”
[16] I-wei Jennifer Chang, China’s Kashmir Policies and Crisis Management in South Asia, Peace Brief no. 217 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, February 9, 2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/02/chinas-kashmir-policies-and-crisis-management-south-asia
[17] Rup Narayan Das, “The Galwan Clash: A Landmark Change in India-China Relations,” Global Asia, June 2021, Global Asia (East Asia Foundation), https://globalasia.org/v16no2/feature/the-galwan-clash-a-landmark-change-in-india-china-relations_rup-narayan-das
[18] Jamie Seidel, “India and Pakistan: Nations on Brink of ‘Nuclear War’,” News.com.au, May 2, 2025, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/india-and-pakistan-nations-on-brink-of-nuclear-war/news-story/2f6d318483fdad71eebf466349123137
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[20] Sheikh Saaliq and Rajesh Roy, “India’s Modi Meets China’s Top Diplomat as Asian Powers Rebuild Ties,” Associated Press, August 19, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/india-china-border-talks-modi-8560a41310cae4c593ae24f11ee06527
[21] Torode, Greg. “India-Pakistan Conflict Offers Rich Intelligence Opportunity for China.” Reuters, May 9, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-pakistan-conflict-offers-rich-intelligence-opportunity-china-2025-05-09/
[22] Sheikh Saaliq, “Here’s Why a Flare-Up Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir Matters,” Associated Press, April 25, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/india-pakistan-kashmir-nuclear-china-876745960ee6cab6f21cb56cac04e13f