A Structural Threat to Jammu & Kashmir’s Agro–Horticulture Economy
The interim
India–US trade arrangement, as publicly outlined, represents not a routine
tariff adjustment but a structural economic shift. Its implications for Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) are disproportionately severe. The region’s economy is
consumption-linked, land-dependent and horticulture-centric. Any surge of
low-priced agricultural imports into Indian markets weakens its production
base. The deal, therefore, is not a neutral trade event. It is a direct
economic stress multiplier for an already fragile mountain economy.
By Mehr un Nisa
Rehman
Three core
arguments establish this risk. First, tariff liberalization on U.S.
agricultural and food products distorts market competition in favour of heavily
subsidized American agribusiness. Second, J&K’s horticulture economy is
price-sensitive, smallholder-driven and logistics-burdened, making it
structurally incapable of absorbing price shocks. Third, downstream economic
effects, employment loss, reduced rural liquidity and shrinking trade margins, extend
beyond farms into the wider regional economy.
Trade Liberalization
vs. Subsidized Agriculture
The trade framework indicates tariff reductions on a “wide range” of U.S. agricultural goods, including fruits, nuts, soybean oil and animal feed inputs. This move exposes Indian producers to competition from one of the most subsidized agricultural systems in the world. U.S. farmers benefit from federal farm support programs worth tens of billions of dollars annually through crop insurance subsidies, price support mechanisms and direct income support.This lowers production risk and stabilizes export pricing. Indian farmers operate under entirely different conditions. Input costs in India have risen sharply. Fertilizer prices, diesel, transport and packaging costs have all increased over recent years. Yet farmgate prices remain volatile.
The imbalance
is clear. When subsidized output enters a price-sensitive market, it does not
compete fairly. It undercuts. The result is price suppression. India has
already witnessed a 34% year-on-year increase in U.S. agricultural imports,
reaching nearly $2.9 billion during recent negotiations. This occurred even
before deeper tariff reductions. A further easing of duties, particularly on
products like soybean oil and fruit categories, is likely to accelerate
inflows.
Why Jammu &
Kashmir Is More Vulnerable Than Other Regions
Jammu &
Kashmir is not an industrial buffer economy. It is agrarian and
horticulture-led. While agriculture contributes around 16% to India’s GDP, it
supports over 45% of India’s population. In J&K, dependency is even higher
in rural districts. Horticulture is the backbone of the region. Apples dominate
this structure.
·
J&K contributes roughly 70–75% of India’s total apple
production.
·
The sector supports over 700,000 families directly or indirectly.
·
Horticulture generates thousands of seasonal jobs in harvesting,
grading, packing and transport.
·
Apple trade drives rural cash circulation before winter months.
Unlike large
mechanised farms abroad, J&K orchards are small and fragmented. Average
landholdings are modest. Production costs per unit are higher due to terrain,
labour intensity and transport from mountainous zones to mainland markets. Imported
apples enter through ports with lower logistics burdens per unit. Even small
price differences shift trader preference. A trader chooses cheaper stock if
margins are higher and quality grades appear uniform.
This is not
theoretical. Past episodes of Iranian, U.S. and other apple imports have
already pressured local pricing.
Price Shock
Dynamics in the Apple Market
Apple markets operate on narrow seasonal windows. A glut during harvest depresses prices sharply. If imported apples are available simultaneously at lower tariffs, domestic growers face a double squeeze: oversupply and undercut pricing. Local growers warn that cheaper imports “ruin” pricing structures. Their fear is rational. Apples are not a diversified risk crop in J&K. They are the primary income source. A fall of even ₹5–10 per kilogram at wholesale level can erase profit margins. Multiply this across millions of boxes and aggregate losses escalate into hundreds of crores.The demand argument that consumers buy more nuts or fruits so imports fill gaps, ignores price elasticity. Demand expansion does not automatically protect local producers. Traders prioritise margin and consistency of supply. Imports often arrive in graded, uniform packaging attractive to wholesalers.
Tariff easing on soybean oil and dried distillers’ grains (DDGs) does not appear, at first glance, directly linked to Jammu and Kashmir’s orchards. Yet the effect is indirect and economically significant. Lower duties on imported soybean oil reduce demand for domestic oilseed crushing and related processing activities across India. When imported feed inputs like DDGs become cheaper, livestock and poultry producers shift toward these alternatives because they offer lower input costs per unit of output. This substitution reduces demand for locally produced feed materials and weakens domestic agro-processing chains. Agricultural economies do not operate in isolation.
They are interdependent
systems in which value addition at one stage sustains income at another. When
import competition compresses margins in oilseed and feed markets, income
contraction spreads across transporters, processors, traders and rural service
providers. The reduction in profitability in one segment therefore dampens
spending power elsewhere. That translates into lower demand for tools,
packaging, fuel, transport services and local retail consumption. Even sectors
geographically distant from major import points feel the impact through reduced
liquidity circulation.
Structural
Disadvantages of J&K Growers
These pressures intersect with structural disadvantages already faced by growers in Jammu and Kashmir. Producers in the region operate under cost and logistical burdens that imported commodities do not bear. Transporting fruit from mountain orchards to major wholesale markets requires longer transit routes and higher freight charges per unit. Cold storage and controlled-atmosphere infrastructure, though expanded in recent years, still does not match total production volumes. This creates seasonal gluts and forces distress sales when storage capacity saturates. Post-harvest losses remain a measurable concern, particularly in years of weather volatility.
Climatic variability, including untimely snowfall
or rainfall, disrupts yield consistency. Pest management expenses have also
risen as disease patterns shift with changing environmental conditions. These
cost factors are embedded in the production structure and cannot be quickly
reduced. Trade liberalisation does not address these inefficiencies. Instead,
it exposes producers carrying these higher cost burdens to competition from
suppliers operating with scale advantages, mechanisation and lower per-unit
logistics expenses. The result is not efficiency correction but margin erosion.
Employment and
Rural Liquidity Impact
The income consequences extend beyond orchard gates. Horticulture earnings underpin rural consumption cycles in Jammu and Kashmir. Harvest season revenue finances household expenditure for education, healthcare, housing repairs and winter necessities. A decline in apple prices or sales volumes therefore reduces the cash available in rural areas for the entire year. Lower orchard income directly translates into fewer hired labour days during pruning, harvesting, grading and packing. Reduced packaging demand affects box manufacturers and suppliers. Transport activity declines when fewer consignments move to wholesale markets.
Commission agents and traders handle smaller volumes, reducing turnover and earnings. These linkages form a multiplier chain. When income in a primary sector shrink, secondary and tertiary rural economic activities also contract. The slowdown becomes region-wide rather than crop-specific.The political response from farmer unions must be interpreted within this economic framework. Their description of the trade shift as a surrender reflects concerns about competitive asymmetry rather than rhetorical positioning. Small and fragmented holdings, characteristic of the region, cannot compete with large-scale, subsidized producers abroad.
This is not a hypothetical claim. It is consistent with
global evidence showing that smallholder systems struggle when exposed suddenly
to liberalized imports without compensatory support mechanisms. Government
assurances regarding safeguards such as quotas or minimum import prices may
offer theoretical protection. However, safeguards are only effective when
activated promptly and implemented rigorously. Agricultural markets, especially
perishable fruit markets, operate within tight seasonal windows. Delays of even
a few weeks can depress prices irreversibly for an entire harvest cycle.
Enforcement gaps or procedural lags therefore carry tangible economic costs.
The Red Line
Debate
The debate over
so-called red lines further illustrates the selective framing of sensitivity.
Authorities emphasize that grains, dairy, poultry and certain other commodities
remain protected. This may indeed shield some agricultural segments nationally.
Yet in Jammu and Kashmir, horticulture, particularly apples, is equally
sensitive in economic terms. The region’s comparative advantage lies in fruit
production. It supplies a substantial share of the country’s apples and
sustains hundreds of thousands of livelihoods. Excluding grains from
concessions does not address the vulnerability of fruit growers. For an economy
where horticulture functions as the primary income pillar, fruit cannot be
treated as a marginal commodity. It is a strategic sector whose stability determines
regional economic resilience.
Taken together, these factors indicate that the trade arrangement introduces asymmetric competition into a structurally fragile mountain economy. It favours producers benefiting from scale, subsidy regimes, advanced logistics networks and price stabilization mechanisms. Jammu and Kashmir’s producers operate with small orchards, higher transport costs and dependence on seasonal price stability.
In such conditions,
even modest price undercutting from imports can depress farmgate rates
significantly. The likely outcomes follow established economic logic: downward
pressure on producer prices, contraction of household incomes for a large rural
population, reduction in seasonal employment and a slowdown in associated trade
and service sectors. Trade policy, therefore, is not an abstract diplomatic
instrument in this context. It directly influences whether orchard-based
livelihoods remain viable or enter a cycle of declining returns. Without robust
tariff buffers or effectively enforced safeguards, the region’s horticulture
economy faces a real risk of destabilization rather than adjustment.
The author is the
head of the research and human rights department of Kashmir Institute of
International Relations (KIIR). She can be contacted at the following email
address: mehr_dua@yahoo.com, X @MHHRsays